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Introduction 
In the course of just thirty years, our society has been transformed from an 
industrial society into an ‘information society’. This transformation has been 
spearheaded by the development of the personal computer and the internet. 
The ‘digital revolution’ has led to significant changes in the way we structure 
our lives and our society. But as digital technology progresses we will likely 
witness an even more profound shift.  
 
According to Wooldridge, the history of computing has been marked by five 
important and continuing trends: ubiquity, interconnection, intelligence, delegation, 
and human-orientation.1 The first trend is a result of the reduction in the cost of 
computing. The low cost of computing power allows for its incorporation 
into a host of different (everyday) devices making computing progressively 
more ubiquitous.2 The second trend is towards the interconnection of 
computer systems into large networked and distributed systems such as the 
internet. The third trend is towards the creation of progressively intelligent 
computer systems able to perform increasingly difficult and complex tasks. 
The fourth trend is towards the delegation of control from the human actor 
to the computer. The fifth trend is towards the creation of computer 
interfaces that more closely reflect the ways in which humans interact with 
their surroundings. Together, these trends will bring about a ‘Ubiquitous 
Network Society’; a society in which every aspect of our daily lives is 
networked and connected.3 
 
Ubiquitous computing is dependent on the processing of data for its 
effectiveness. As such, vast amounts of data will be processed in the 
Ubiquitous Networks Society. These data include location data, personal 
data, object related data, and transactional data. But while computing power 
will become ubiquitous, and the processing of data will become pervasive, 
the visibility of data processing will decrease. As Mark Weiser put it: “The 
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most profound technologies are those that disappear. They weave themselves 
into the fabric of everyday life until they are indistinguishable from it.”4   
 
Pervasive computing and information processing coupled with decreasing 
transparency due to diminishing visibility will present serious challenges to 
our society. Risks associated with data processing are: breaches of 
confidentiality, information asymmetries and misinterpretation of available 
data.  
 
Currently, invoking the right to privacy mitigates risks associated with the 
processing of personal data. The right to privacy ensures that we can shield 
ourselves, and our personal data, from the prying eyes of others. However, in 
a future of ubiquitous computing, where pervasive information processing is 
the norm, it will become harder to maintain (informational) privacy. 
Moreover, the distinction between the public and the private sphere will 
become increasingly blurred as a result of ubiquitous computing. This places 
our current notion of privacy under pressure. It is therefore necessary to 
examine how privacy will evolve, and ascertain whether it can provide 
adequate protection against excessive surveillance. 
 
In this article I will describe 1) how developments in IT will enable new 
surveillance applications, 2) what possible risks these new surveillance 
applications entail, 3) how the notion of privacy will be influenced by these 
technologies, and 4) how we can protect ourselves in the future. 
 
I. Technology 
The convergence of trends like ubiquity, interconnection, intelligence, 
delegation, and human-orientation will ultimately bring about the Ubiquitous 
Network Society. Key technological drivers for the development of the 
Ubiquitous Network Society are automatic identification and data capturing, 
mobile networking and artificial intelligence. 
 
I.1. Automatic Identification and Data Capturing (AIDC) 
A central element of the Ubiquitous Network Society is that objects in the 
physical world will be able to communicate with us and with each other. To 
this end they need to have a unique identity (e.g. an IP-address), sensor 
capabilities to sense objects or persons in the physical world, and the ability 
to transmit information. By employing technologies such as Radio Frequency 
Identification (RFID), Near Field Communication (NFC), 2D matrix codes 
and different types of sensors (e.g. motion sensors, heat sensor and cameras), 
we can create ‘an internet of things’. 
 
I.2. Mobile Networking 
While AIDC technologies provide ‘last (centi)meter connectivity’, powerful 
third and fourth generation mobile networks provide the connection 
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between people and the internet. Mobile internet is rapidly expanding and 
enables us to connect with vast repositories of information from any 
location. By adding GPS and other localisation tools to mobile equipment, 
location based services and geo-location become possible. Currently, these 
features are packed within so-called smart-phones. In the future, Heads-Up 
Displays in glasses or even in contact lenses will become the norm. 
 
I.3. Artificial Intelligence 
Artificial intelligence technologies enable computers to recognise patterns 
(such as faces) and make sense of vast amounts of data that need to be 
processed in order to respond effectively and efficiently to situations in the 
physical world. Through artificial intelligence, our physical world can become 
an intelligent environment that can react to our wishes, wants, and needs.5  
 
II. The Transformation of the Public Domain 
Currently, the public domain is an area where, apart from closed circuit 
television (CCTV) and the location data of mobile phones, little data is 
recorded. The digital world is thus, for the most part, separated from the 
physical world. But through the integration and convergence of the above-
mentioned technologies, the digital world and the physical world will become 
increasingly intertwined, significantly altering our ideas about the public 
domain. 
 
For the topic discussed in this paper (i.e., the future of privacy and the public 
domain in relation to surveillance), the most relevant applications of 
surveillance technology in the Ubiquitous Network Society are ‘mirror 
worlds’ and ‘augmented reality’. 
 
II.1. Mirror Worlds 
Mirror worlds are information-enhanced virtual models or ‘reflections’ of the 
physical world. Their construction involves sophisticated virtual mapping, 
modelling and annotation tools, geospatial and other sensors, and location-
aware technologies.6 Google Earth is a good example of a mirror world 
application. Mirror worlds can be based on recorded information (e.g. 
photos, historical data, maps of buildings), but as we move towards the 
Ubiquitous Network Society, we will move towards mirror worlds that 
operate in real-time.  
 
Mirror worlds enable us to get a clearer picture of what is happening in the 
physical world. Currently we mainly use sensor technologies (predominantly 
CCTV) to establish what is going on at a certain place, but these sensor data 
are not combined with other sources of information such as geographical 
data, historical data, newsfeeds, data from UAVs (unmanned aerial vehicles), 
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information from onsite actors et cetera. By combining various information 
feeds, situational awareness can be enhanced, thereby making the decision 
making process more effective and efficient.  
 
Situational awareness is vital for effectively implementing command-control 
structures. It is therefore not surprising that the idea of ubiquitous 
networking and integration of data sources features prominently in modern 
military doctrine (the doctrine of network-centric warfare). The police are 
also leveraging the advantages of information technology. This has led to the 
notion of ‘intelligence led policing’, whereby crime control focuses upon the 
identification, analysis and management of persisting and developing 
problems or risks.7 Intelligence led policing allows for the more efficient and 
effective application of limited police resources. By using pre-recorded and 
analysed data, as well as real-time information, police tasks can be executed 
more efficiently. 
 
Apart from heightening situational awareness, mirror worlds can also be used 
to influence the public domain in real-time. A current example is traffic 
management. Operators can dynamically display the maximum speed on 
matrix signs over the roads depending on the current traffic situation. 
Heightened situational awareness, coupled with networked objects and 
infrastructures in the physical world (e.g. gates, roadblocks, screens, 
microphones) will allow for more direct control over our physical world. For 
instance, when a demonstration threatens to turn violent, operators could 
‘change’ the architecture of a public place by closing off roads or setting up 
choke points in order to control the size of the crowd and deny access to 
certain areas. Moreover, they could use TV screens and microphones to 
address the crowd. 
 
II.2. Augmented Reality 
Mirror worlds provide a representation of the physical world that exists as a 
separate entity. In other words, mirror worlds are models, representations 
and copies that exist solely in cyberspace. While they can be used as tools to 
make sense of the physical world, and even directly influence it, they are 
separated from everyday reality. This is set to change through augmented 
reality. In augmented reality, technology enhances the external physical world 
for the individual through the use of location-aware systems and interfaces 
that process and layer networked information on top of our everyday 
perception of the world.8 As such, augmented reality integrates the digital 
and the physical world into one coherent reality. While mirror worlds can 
give a high level overview (i.e., strategic and operational) used for command-
and-control purposes, augmented reality can provide rich information for 
units ‘on the ground’.  
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A good example of a possible future augmented reality application is given in 
the novel Halting State by Charles Stross. In this novel, Stross describes how 
police officers, wearing special glasses, have a layer of additional information 
projected on top of the physical world in order to help them with their police 
work. This hybrid reality, which mixes real world images with information 
from the digital world, is called ‘CopSpace’: 
 
“…CopSpace sheds some light on matters, of course. Blink and it descends in its full glory. 
Here's the spiralling red diamond of a couple of ASBO cases on the footpath (orange 
jackets, blue probation service tags saying they're collecting litter.) There's the green tree of 
signs sprouting over the doorway of number thirty-nine, each tag naming the legal tenants of 
a different flat. Get your dispatcher to drop you a ticket, and the signs open up to give you 
their full police and social service case files, where applicable... …This is the twenty-first 
century, and all the terabytes of CopSpace have exploded out of the dusty manila files and 
into the real world...”9 
 
Through augmented reality, users can gain access to relevant information 
about objects, locations and even individuals in real-time, aiding them in their 
decision making process.10 
  
III. Consequences and Risks 
Mirror worlds and augmented reality will change the way in which we view 
the public domain. Moreover, the use of these technologies for surveillance 
purposes can significantly impact individuals in the public domain. In this 
section/chapter I shall describe some possible risks associated with 
surveillance in the Ubiquitous Network Society. 
 
III.1. The (Super)Panopticon 
In 1791, social reformer and philosopher Jeremy Bentham introduced a new 
type of penitentiary design he called the ‘Panopticon’.11 The aim of this 
revolutionary prison design was to keep the inmates under close and 
continuous scrutiny. The prisoners were not allowed any private space and 
were given the impression that they could be watched at all times. Hence, 
Bentham named his prison design the ‘Panopticon’, Greek for ‘all-seeing 
place’. The essence of surveillance according to Foucault is the accumulation 
of information and the direct supervision of subordinates.12 The panoptic 
concept is therefore associated with current electronic surveillance practices. 
However, the use of electronic surveillance has moved beyond the confines 
of a single prison, and is prevalent all around us. Therefore, Poster has 
described surveillance in our society as being ‘superpanoptic’.13 The 
Panopticon brings with it two specific risks that threaten the autonomy of 
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the individual: direct and indirect discipline.  
 
First, surveillance facilitates direct discipline by giving those employing it 
more power over the subjects being surveilled. In a Ubiquitous Network 
Society this risk is even greater. Not only because there is more information 
available, but also because surveillance will increasingly be in real-time. 
Currently, surveillance information is, for the most part, used ex-post. 
However, this will change with the rise of the Ubiquitous Network Society. 
Given the fact that the digital world and the physical world will be closely 
intertwined, surveillance operators will even have the ability to trigger events 
and actions from a distance as mentioned above. This development will 
change surveillance from an ‘architecture of observation’ to an ‘architecture 
of control’, which will negatively impact the autonomy of individuals and 
groups who move through the public domain to a far greater extent than 
currently possible. 
 
Second, there is the risk of indirect discipline. Foucault described the 
Panopticon as a “subtle, calculated technology of subjection”.14 For him the 
Panopticon was a means to “induce in the inmate a state of conscious and 
permanent visibility that ensures the automatic functioning of power”.15 The 
actual exercise of power is no longer necessary, since the subjects are aware 
that they are constantly being watched and will alter their behaviour 
accordingly. So instead of external discipline, the Panopticon establishes a 
situation where the inmates actually discipline themselves. The same logic 
could apply to surveillance in society. 
 
Whether permanent surveillance in the public domain will have a self-
disciplining effect on citizens remains unclear. Currently, with the use of 
CCTV for instance, people seem to experience little panoptic feelings. This 
can best be explained by two factors. First, for the most part citizens feel that 
the observing gaze of the CCTV cameras is benevolent. People assume that 
it adds to their security and that they as law-abiding citizens have nothing to 
hide. Second, people do not yet experience the use of CCTV as a form of 
permanent visibility. But in the Ubiquitous Network Society the possibility 
that some form of permanent visibility is established is much greater than in 
our current society. Also, the disciplining effects of surveillance will be much 
more evident when actions can be taken in real-time by the surveillance 
operators. Raised awareness of direct discipline might in turn lead to self-
disciplining or ‘indirect-discipline’.  
 
III.2. Lack of Transparency 
One of the characteristics of the Ubiquitous Network Society is that 
‘computing will move to the background of our lives’. In other words, it will 
become less obvious how, why, when and where personal data is being 
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processed. Furthermore, it will become less clear who has access to the data 
being processed. 
 
First of all, transparency is hampered by the technology itself. In the 
Ubiquitous Network Society information gathering will for the most part be 
unobtrusive. In other words, it will not always be clear for data subjects that 
personal data is being processed. This is part and parcel of the ubiquitous 
computing design philosophy: interaction with information systems should 
be intuitive, and users should not be burdened. Unfortunately, this same 
design philosophy also entails that for most users, pervasive computing 
systems are ‘black boxes’. While from a design and computing perspective 
these are sometimes preferable qualities (they may decrease intrusiveness of 
ICT), from a legal perspective these design principles can be less desirable, 
since they shift away control (and thus power) from the individual.16 
 
A second problem with the transparency of surveillance in the Ubiquitous 
Network Society is the multitude of actors involved. While the 
(super)panoptic model is highly relevant as a metaphor for the development 
of the surveillance society, it does not accurately reflect the way in which 
surveillance will be conducted in the Ubiquitous Network Society. The 
sensor- and data feeds will fuel mirror worlds, and augmented reality will not 
exclusively belong to public sector actors. On the contrary, most of the data 
will belong to private actors, such as companies and individuals. As such, 
there is no single controlling entity (i.e. the state) in the Ubiquitous Network 
Society, as implied in superpanoptic theory. The idea that surveillance is not 
exclusively conducted by the state has led Haggerty and Ericson to come up 
with the notion of the ‘surveillant assemblage’.17 An assemblage is not a 
discretely bounded, structured, and stable whole, but is made up of a 
multitude of interrelated parts. In the surveillant assemblage there is no single 
entity in control of all these systems, but rather control is distributed 
throughout a host of different actors in society. As such, it will become less 
clear who is in control of the data and who has access to it, thus creating a 
lack of transparency. 
 
The fact that surveillance infrastructures will not exclusively belong to the 
state, does not imply that the state will not have access to private surveillance 
infrastructures and even personal data feeds. Surveillance is driven by the 
desire to bring systems together, to combine practices and technologies and 
integrate them into a larger whole. It is likely that the integration and 
convergence of technologies will lead previously discrete surveillance systems 
to become increasingly interlocked.18 In this way the state can ‘tap’ into the 
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private sector surveillance apparatus and obtain additional surveillance data. 
As such public sector and private sector surveillance will become closely 
integrated.19 So while the possibilities and effectiveness of state surveillance 
will be greater, there will be less control and oversight. 
 
III.3. Digital Discrimination 
While mirror worlds, augmented reality, and other surveillance tools can aid 
in applying scarce police resources more effectively, they also create the risk 
of excessive trust in the system, which in turn might lead to ‘digital 
discrimination’.  
 
Since humans are unable to process all the different data feeds that the 
ubiquitous network provides at the same time, filtering mechanisms will be 
used that present the data to humans in a structured and comprehensible 
way. However, this also means that information will be displayed in a 
compressed way. In particular with augmented reality, police officers will 
likely use the limited information on individuals presented to them as their 
lead for follow-up actions (e.g. pulling people over, searches and seizure). 
While this can be beneficial, it also creates the risk that the police officers will 
rely too much on the system and its underlying assumptions, possibly 
bypassing their own personal insights, experience and other factors. By 
ignoring important contextual information not included in the ‘digital file’ of 
a person or not relying on their own insights, police officers could overlook 
vital information, or become (more) biased in their actions against certain 
individuals or groups. For instance, ethnic registration and racial profiling 
could lead to discrimination of minorities. Another example could be ex-
criminals who would literally be followed around by their criminal record, 
leading to increased and possibly unwarranted police attention. 
 
III.4. False Positives and False Negatives 
An issue with surveillance in general is that of false positives and false 
negatives, and this is also true for surveillance in the Ubiquitous Network 
Society. Since surveillance technology is not infallible, it is likely that 
surveillance systems will also point at people who are in fact not criminals or 
terrorists at all (false negatives). Even with a 99% accuracy rate, this will 
mean that in public places, where there are a lot of people, the number of 
false positives will be considerable. The other problem is false negatives. 
Since most of the information on crime and terrorism that will guide 
surveillance is based on previous experiences and behaviour, new forms of 
deviant behaviour may escape attention. Since criminals and terrorists 
innovate too, they will employ new methods and use new attack vectors that 
are not yet detectable by surveillance systems. 
In summary we can state that in the future the power of surveillance and its 
effect on life in the public domain will be greater, while the transparency of 
surveillance will decrease. This will lead to information asymmetries between 
the surveyors and those being surveilled. Without proper oversight and 
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checks and balances, surveillance may pose an increased threat to personal 
autonomy. Up until now, the right to privacy is used to negate any 
information asymmetries, however, it is unclear whether this will be 
sufficient in the future. 
 
IV. Privacy  
The need for privacy is probably as old as mankind itself, and virtually all 
societies, both primitive and modern, have techniques for setting distances 
and avoiding contact in order to afford members of a measure of privacy.20 
Before the upcoming of modern technology, physical boundaries combined 
with rules, customs and taboo created a distinction between the ‘public’ and 
the ‘private’. But as technology progressed, physical barriers became less 
effective in protecting privacy, making legal protection more important. 
Particularly the rise of information technology and electronic recordkeeping 
led to a changing notion of privacy. As the processing of personal data 
became commonplace, the focus of the privacy debate shifted from the 
protection of the ‘classic’ dimensions of privacy (body, home, and 
correspondence) to the protection of personal data.21 The protection of 
personal data led to the notion of ‘informational privacy’. Westin described 
informational privacy as: 
 
“the claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to determine for themselves 
when, how and to what extent information about them is communicated.”22 
 
Privacy and the protection of personal data serve various purposes within 
our society. In the context of surveillance, privacy primarily serves as a limit 
to power and government intervention. Hiding information or denying 
access to it through the right to privacy can help avoid information 
asymmetries. Invoking the right to privacy thus protects the autonomy of 
groups and individuals. However, the Ubiquitous Network Society will bring 
new challenges to the concept of privacy that will make it difficult to 
maintain as a viable concept. 
 
V. Challenges to the Concept of Privacy 
Privacy has always been a concept in transition. New technologies in 
particular have led to changing ideas and notions of privacy. Now, as our 
society changes into a Ubiquitous Network Society, the concept of privacy is 
set to face yet another transformation. By definition, privacy is dependent on 
a distinction between what is public and what is private. The idea of 
(informational) privacy in the public domain is thus problematic. However, 
in the discourse on surveillance, (informational) privacy features prominently. 
When it comes to surveillance and privacy in public places there are two 
main questions that need to be answered: 1) who may be surveilled under 
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what circumstances, and 2) how may data garnered from surveillance be 
used? 
 
In surveillance discourse answers to these questions have mainly been sought 
in the doctrine of the reasonable expectation of privacy, personal data 
protection law and the law of criminal procedure. In my view, the doctrine of 
the reasonable expectation of privacy and the law of criminal procedure will 
not provide adequate protection in the Ubiquitous Network Society. 
 
V.1. The Reasonable Expectation of Privacy 
The reasonable expectation of privacy criterion limits the right to privacy to 
those instances where an individual indeed has a reasonable expectation of 
privacy. In other words, the individual must demonstrate the wish that his 
conduct remains private and society must acknowledge the fact that the 
individuals conduct is indeed private. The reasonable expectation of privacy 
thus entails two separate elements: (1) an objective element (how does the 
individual behave?), and (2) a subjective/normative element (what can the 
individual expect judging from his behaviour?). The answers to these 
separate questions determine whether there is a reasonable expectation of 
privacy. An indication that an individual may have a reasonable expectation 
of privacy can be that his behaviour takes place in an area that is considered 
‘private’, examples being: at home, in his car, or in a fitting room. 
 
But do individuals have the same subjective expectation of privacy when they 
are in the public domain (e.g. walking on the street, sitting in a park, waiting 
in line at city hall)? Probably not. And if they do, this expectation can shift 
once they become aware that opportunities for surveillance in the Ubiquitous 
Network Society are omnipresent. It is thus not surprising that the use of the 
reasonable expectation of privacy criterion has been widely criticised as 
useless, simply because reasonable expectations of privacy in a certain 
situation can disappear as soon as privacy is invaded on a routinely basis.23 So 
the protection resulting from employing the reasonable expectation of 
privacy criterion is limited. Moreover, as ‘privacy sensitive’ technologies 
continue to develop, how will the reasonable expectation of privacy criterion 
hold up in the future? 
 
V.2. The Law of Criminal Procedure 
While data protection law provides us with clear requirements for the fair 
processing of personal data (e.g. notification, purpose binding, transparency), 
the law of criminal procedure (which governs surveillance for the most part) 
does not always set forth such requirements.24 For instance, notification is 
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often impossible, because it would alert suspects that they are being watched. 
Furthermore, while personal data protection law to a large extent prohibits 
private sector actors from using personal data, the same rules do not 
necessarily apply to surveillance by public sector actors. Once data enters the 
public sphere, it is for the most part considered ‘available’ for surveillance 
purposes, since data subjects do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy 
with regard to data they willingly place in the public sphere. For instance, 
information published by users on their social networking site can be used as 
evidence in a criminal procedure. The same logic could apply to personal 
data processed in a fully networked public domain. 
 
VI. Safeguarding Privacy and Autonomy 
From the above we may conclude that privacy will become increasingly hard 
to conceptualise and apply as a workable concept in the context of 
surveillance and the Ubiquitous Network Society. Several authors such as 
Brin and Bailey have therefore given up privacy as a workable concept 
altogether and instead stress the importance of transparency as a means to 
protect (individual) autonomy.25 It is my expectation that in twenty years 
time there will be no more privacy; that is to say, physical barriers such as 
walls and fading memories will no longer afford privacy. Everything can and 
will be recorded and stored for future reference in the Ubiquitous Network 
Society. But that does not mean there will no longer be a need for privacy. 
The transformation of the public domain will force us to rethink our concept 
of privacy and come up with new methods for restoring privacy and 
safeguarding autonomy. Below I shall describe several ideas and concepts. 
 
VI.1. Privacy by Design 
Privacy by design is a design philosophy whereby privacy rules are 
incorporated in the design of an information system. By ‘hardwiring’ privacy 
rules into the technology, unnecessary breaches of privacy are prevented. 
Means of reducing the availability of personal data through technology 
include anonimisation, authentication, and selective disclosure. Privacy by 
design is more effective than legal protection in itself, since rules can be 
broken or changed, whilst the design of an information system can force 
users to comply with the rules set forth in the design.  
 
VI.2. Privacy as a Collective Interest 
Currently, privacy is conceptualised as an individual right. However, the 
interests that privacy in the Ubiquitous Network Society aims to protect are 
actually collective interests (i.e. trust, autonomy, social cohesion and equal 
treatment). Thus, positioning privacy as an individual right may actually be 
counterproductive; the ‘secretivism’ normally associated with privacy will 
reinforce notions of the collective versus the individual. By positioning 
privacy as a prerequisite for the development of a stable, democratic and free 
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society, discussions that position an individual’s right to privacy versus the 
security of society as a whole can be avoided. 
 
VI.3. Trust  
Evidence suggests that when individuals perceive that others are behaving 
cooperatively, they are moved by honour and altruism, and will be inclined to 
contribute to public goods even without the inducement of material 
incentives. When, in contrast, they perceive that others are shirking or 
otherwise taking advantage of them, individuals are moved by resentment. In 
that circumstance, they will withhold beneficial forms of cooperation.26 We 
may infer from this that when surveillance infrastructures are no longer 
perceived to be beneficial to those under surveillance, or their operation is no 
longer transparent, they will elicit negative responses from groups and 
individuals. This could lead to the evasion of surveillance or possibly even 
the sabotage of surveillance infrastructures.  
 
We have established that a lack of transparency is particularly likely in the 
Ubiquitous Network Society, where surveillance is for the most part a ‘black 
box’. It is therefore extremely important to find ways to ensure trust in 
surveillance in the Ubiquitous Network Society. Proportionality, subsidiarity, 
judicial oversight and regular reviews of surveillance practices are absolutely 
necessary not only to ensure the legitimacy of surveillance practices, but also 
to foster trust in their application. 
 
VI.4. Transparency and Reciprocity (by Design) 
Even though privacy will remain an important right in the Ubiquitous 
Network Society, we must acknowledge the fact that in itself, privacy will be 
inadequate and possibly even counterproductive as a means to maintain 
personal autonomy. We have established that the main issue when it comes 
to surveillance in the Ubiquitous Network Society is information asymmetry: 
whilst the surveyors have access to all the information, the surveilled do not. 
This means that the surveilled are fully transparent, while the process of 
surveillance is not.  
 
Therefore, authors like Brin and Bailey have looked towards (reciprocal) 
transparency as a means to negate information asymmetries. The idea of 
reciprocal transparency and the related notion of sousveillance are based on the 
premise that surveillance power should be equally distributed. Brin argues 
that the current distribution of surveillance power in society is unequal as it is 
concentrated mainly within existing power structures like the government 
and the major corporations. In order to restore this balance we must not try 
to hide information or ban the use of it through the right to privacy, but 
rather we must opt for full transparency using a quid pro quo system of 
surveillance. When an actor in society (a person, government agency, or 
corporation) wants to bring surveillance powers to bear against another, the 
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actor himself (or itself) must be submitted to the same form of surveillance. 
According to Brin, this approach will stimulate the equal distribution of 
surveillance powers, increase transparency and accountability, and lead to a 
more responsible use of surveillance powers.  
 
While Brin puts forward a persuasive argument for reciprocal transparency, I 
believe Brin’s transparent society is undesirable, due to the fact that it might 
lead to a tyranny of the majority over the minority. Another problem with 
Brin’s idea is that it is almost impossible to distribute surveillance power 
equally amongst all. Surveillance is labour intensive and capital intensive, 
meaning most individuals cannot afford to use surveillance power in ways 
the more affluent individuals or institutions can. Moreover, governments and 
companies might have legitimate privacy interests as well (for instance those 
related to national security or competition), making reciprocal transparency 
virtually impossible. 
 
However, this does not mean that we should discard transparency and 
reciprocity altogether. On the contrary, both transparency and reciprocity 
should feature far more prominently in the Ubiquitous Network Society to 
mitigate the risks of information asymmetries. In particular, we should 
remedy some the ‘black box’ nature of the Ubiquitous Network Society. 
While there are data protection rules in place that are aimed at increasing 
transparency, up until now the idea of transparency is not part of an actual 
design philosophy. This is important, since a major aspect of the design 
philosophy for pervasive computing systems in the Ubiquitous Network 
Society is that they should not burden the user. Ideally, the use of 
information systems should be unobtrusive and intuitive. But this design 
philosophy also makes the information systems less transparent. Therefore, 
an approach that entails that the data subject is granted maximum access to 
the acts of data processing in order to keep a form of reciprocity between the 
data subject and the company or institution using his data is necessary. We 
call this approach ‘transparency and reciprocity by design’. 
 
By creating tools and functional design guidelines for ubiquitous data 
processing we can create a greater degree of transparency and empower the 
user. Ideas in this area include: 1) easy mechanisms for accessing and 
querying databases associated with ubiquitous computing (for instance via 
agent technology), 2) tools for explaining/visualising automated decision 
processes, 3) setting forth rules for changing or removing personal data by 
the data subject, 4) the creation of log files that are intelligible for users, even 
without a deep understanding of the system, and 5) regular reviews of 
systems and applications. 
 
Transparency and reciprocity are thus vital to retain and grow trust in 
surveillance in the Ubiquitous Network Society. 
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Conclusion 
The technologies that will facilitate the Ubiquitous Network Society promise 
to greatly enhance our lives, making it easier, more comfortable and more 
efficient. These technologies will also enable the development of surveillance 
applications such as mirror worlds and augmented reality that promise to 
increase our security by providing law enforcement agencies with real-time 
data they need to become more efficient and effective.  
 
However, the use of surveillance in the Ubiquitous Network Society is not 
without risks. Surveillance creates information asymmetries that lead to 
power asymmetries. Furthermore, reliance on surveillance data also heightens 
the risk of ‘digital discrimination’ and exposes individuals to the risk of false 
positives. These risks are compounded by the fact that surveillance in the 
Ubiquitous Network Society will be far less transparent than it currently is. 
This can be attributed to three related factors: 1) there will be far more data 
available (in some cases provided by the data subjects themselves), 2) there 
will be more parties gathering and sharing information, 3) data gathering will 
be unobtrusive. Ultimately, this means that privacy as a ‘physical property’ 
will become a thing of the past, leaving us with privacy as a right. As I have 
argued in this article, the right to privacy by itself will not be enough to 
protect the autonomy of groups and individuals. The reasonable expectation 
of the privacy criterion and the law of criminal procedure will not provide 
adequate mechanisms to remedy information asymmetries. Therefore we 
need different mechanisms to ensure autonomy and privacy. 
 
When it comes to protective measures to function alongside the right to 
privacy, trust and transparency should feature prominently. In particular the 
black box nature of the ubiquitous network needs to be remedied. To this 
end we need to establish some measure of reciprocity and empower the data 
subject. Creating tools and functional design guidelines for ubiquitous data 
processing can help reduce the privacy risks of the ubiquitous computing 
age. 
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